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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Did the lower court err in failing to grant Hillside's motion for summary 
judgment dated March 16, 2001 where Rite Aid never responded to said motion, thereby 
admitting pursuant to Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 Hillside's allegation that it mailed the 
January 21, 1997 letter to Rite Aid's predecessor? Furthermore, should the Court have 
proceeded to hear Hillside's unlawful detainer action and ruled thereon in favor of Hillside 
in light of Judge Hanson's remarks at trial that a finding that the January 21,1997 letter was 
mailed to Rite Aid's predecessor would have been dispositive in favor of Hillside? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law, a reviewing court accords no deference to the lower court's resolution of the 
legal issues presented. A reviewing court determines only whether the lower court erred in 
applying the governing law and whether the lower court correctly made a determination as 
to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson v. Boy Scouts of 
America. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). 
Issue No. 2: Did the lower court err in finding for Rite Aid at trial in light of 
paragraph 24 of the Lease, which specifically requires Rite Aid to send notices and rent to 
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the same address, in light of the September 2 letter, and in light of the totality of the evidence 
indicating that Rite Aid knew or should have known where to send the lease renewal notice? 
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous. These issues entail a review of the lower 
court's findings of fact based on the evidence presented at trial, rendering the clearly 
erroneous standard appropriate. State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, If 6, 994 P.2d 1243. 
Issue No. 3: Did the lower court err in noting at trial that even if Rite Aid sent its 
lease renewal notice to the incorrect address, that error was the result of an honest and 
justifiable mistake, that Hillside presented no evidence showing Rite Aid was negligent in 
exercising its option to renew, and that Rite Aid would have prevailed based on language in 
the Utah Supreme Court case Utah Coal and Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited (2001 UT 100, 40 P.3d 581)? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. The issue of whether a party's failure to properly 
renew a lease constitutes a mistake is a question of law, rendering a correction of error 
standard of review appropriate. State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, ^  6, 994 P.2d 1243. 
Issue No. 4: Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid its attorney fees where the 
lease agreement provides that fees "shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have 
violated any of the terms or provisions of this Lease" and Hillside's purported violation was 
the pursuit of its unlawful detainer action? Furthermore, did the lower court err in awarding 
Rite Aid its full attorney fees where Rite Aid employed the services of two law firms and two 
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experienced senior partners and where the litigation was relatively simple and did not present 
novel legal issues? 
Standard of Review: Patent Error or Clear Abuse of Discretion. The issue of whether 
a lower court's award of attorney fees was reasonable is subject to the patent error or clear 
abuse of discretion standard. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 provides: 
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported 
by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement of disputed facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final order and judgment entered by the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County on January 29, 2003, 
finding that Rite Aid, as tenant, had properly exercised its option to renew a lease 
agreement entered into with Hillside, as landlord. R. at 1041-1043. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS FOUND BY LOWER COURT 
1. On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates ("HPA"), as landlord, 
entered into a written Lease Agreement ("Lease") with Skaggs Companies, Inc. 
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("Skaggs"), as tenant, in which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East 
7000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (uthe Property"). R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact«[ 5. 
2. Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Thrifty Payless, who was the 
successor-in-interest to Skaggs. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact ^ 6. 
3. Hillside Plaza, Ltd. d/b/a Hillside Plaza Properties ("Hillside") is the 
successor-in-interest to HPA. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, % 7. 
4. American Drug Stores, a previous successor-in-interest to Skaggs, 
guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to, assignees of, or 
subtenants under, its interests. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, f 8. 
5. The original lease term began on October 6, 1975, and was to expire on 
January 31, 2001 unless Rite Aid gave Hillside timely written notice of Rite Aid's intent 
to renew the Lease. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 9. 
6. At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired Commerce 
Properties Management Corporation (UCPMC") to perform property management 
functions for the Property. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 10. 
7. On March 19, 1992, CPMC sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit 2) giving Rite 
Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice: 
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and other mail to 
our former address. Effective March 20, 1992 our brokerage company is 
moving from their location at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In 
the future all rental payments and mail for [Commerce Properties] should 
be addressed as follows: 
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Hillside Plaza Limited 
Commerce Properties Management Corp. 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1f 11. 
8. In or about September of 1996, Hillside removed CPMC as the property 
management company of the Property and replaced it with Hillside Management. R. at 
1078; T. at 176. 
9. On September 2, 1996, John Johnson of Hillside Management sent a form 
letter (Trial Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest Thrifty Pay less, informing it 
that "the property management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have 
been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management/' The letter also mentioned 
several capital improvements that Hillside Management had planned for the shopping 
center. It further instructed Thrifty to wCplease mail your future rent payments as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center 
c/o Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84090" 
R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 12. 
10. Although the September 2 letter was not sent by registered or certified 
mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and acted on the letter soon after 
September 2, 1996, and placed the letter in its lease file. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 
1 1 3 . 
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11. The September 2 letter did not specifically reference where to send "mail" 
or "other mail". R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1j 14. 
12. At the time the September 2 letter was sent. Hillside Management had 
taken over all of the property management duties from the prior property management 
company, CPMC. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact 1 15. 
13. From 1996 to 1999, Hillside Management communicated to Rite Aid at 
least seven times that items such as tax payments, correspondence and invoices, were to 
be sent to the Hillside Management address. R. at 1078; T. at 188-190. 
14. From December 1996 to January 2000, Rite Aid sent approximately twelve 
items, including letters, reports, and legal notices, to the Hillside Management address set 
forth in the September 2, 1996 letter. R. at 1078; T. at 184-188. 
15. On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside (Trial Exhibit 4), requesting 
that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all future non-legal 
correspondence such as billings be sent to a different address. R. at 958-967; Findings of 
Fact, T| 16. 
16. Rite Aid sent Trial Exhibit 4 to Hillside via the address of the prior 
property management company, CPMC. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 17. 
17. Hillside Management received Trial Exhibit 4 shortly after March 21, 
1997. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, H 18. 
18. The Lease provides, at |^ 2: 
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OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the term of 
this Lease for not to exceed four separate and additional consecutive 
periods of 5 years each. Each such extension shall be exercised by 
giving written notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the 
expiration of the original term hereof or any such extended term. 
Upon such exercise, this Lease and the Lease Agreement shall be 
deemed to be extended without the execution of any further lease 
[or] other instrument. 
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite Aid's exercise of the 
renewal option not later than August 4, 2000, which date was 180 days prior to the 
expiration of the Lease on January 31, 2001. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 19. 
19. On June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via certified mail, return receipt 
requested, its notice of renewal of the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the address of the prior 
property management company: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Suite D, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84107. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 20. 
20. CPMC received Rite Aid's renewal notice on June 29, 2000. R. at 958-
967; Findings of Fact, ^ 21. 
21. Ellen Long of CPMC received the renewal notice but could not say with 
certainty at trial whether she forwarded the renewal notice on to Hillside Management or 
attempted to return it to Rite Aid. However, Ms. Long testified that she believes she 
"probably" or "likely" forwarded it to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 91-92. 
22. John Johnson of Hillside Management testified that neither Hillside 
Management nor Hillside received a copy of the renewal notice until approximately six 
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weeks after the lease renewal deadline had passed. R. at 1078; T. at 173; R. at 1077; T. 
at 112. 
23. The first time either Hillside or Hillside Management received a copy of 
the renewal notice was on or about September 20, 2000, when counsel for Hillside 
provided it to John Johnson of Hillside Management after it had been provided by 
counsel for Rite Aid. R. at 1078; T. at 173. 
24. Sometime after the August 4, 2001 renewal date had passed, Hillside, 
through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to 
exercise the option as the Lease required. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 37. 
25. Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from Annette Johnson of 
Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest. R. at 1078; T. 
at 189. 
26. This letter stated that: 
Hillside Plaza is under new management. ... Please change your 
records to send future correspondence and invoices to: [Hillside 
Management address]. 
R. at 1078; T. at 189. 
27. At trial, John Johnson of Hillside Management testified that a copy of the 
January 21, 1997 letter, which was part of Trial Exhibit 55, was kept in Hillside's Rite 
Aid lease file in the ordinary course of business. R. at 1078; T. at 179-180. 
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28. At trial, Annette Johnson of Hillside Management was not called as a 
witness and thus there was no testimony from Annette Johnson about the mailing of the 
January 2L 1997 letter to Lu Strong. R. 1079; T. at 282; R. at 958-967; Findings of 
Fact, H 25. 
29. The trial court expressed great concern over the authenticity of the January 
21, 1997 letter and ruled that Hillside had not met its burden of proving that Hillside 
Management mailed said letter. Thus, the trial court completely disregarded the January 
21, 1997 letter as evidence. R. 1079; T. at 282-284; R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, <j 
27. 
30. In writing the September 2 letter, Hillside Management intended to change 
the mailing address for all purposes from CPMC to Hillside Management. R. 1079; T. at 
284-285; R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact f 28. 
31. The trial court ruled that Hillside Management could have written the 
September 2 letter in such a way as to more clearly and unequivocally change the mailing 
address for all types of notices. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 37. 
32. It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for landlords and 
tenants to establish multiple addresses for various types of correspondence. R. at 958-
967; Findings of Fact, If 31. 
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33. The phrase "property management" does not have any standard or generally 
recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 
1132. 
34. On or about December 21, 2000, Rite Aid moved for summary judgment. 
R. at 75-77. 
35. On or about March 16, 2001, Hillside submitted a memorandum opposing 
Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment. R. at 355-434. 
36. Simultaneously, Hillside filed its own motion for summary judgment. In its 
supporting memorandum, Hillside introduced several "undisputed facts". Undisputed 
Fact No. 4 included the following text: 
Subsequent to September 2, 1996, Hillside sent Rite Aid or its 
predecessor-in-interest seven separate written notices of property 
management's new and substituted address, two of which notices were 
sent by certified mail. Furthermore, the notice dated January 21, 1997 
requests Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest to "change your records to 
send future correspondence and invoices to' the new address. 
R. at 352-354; 355-434. This fact was supported by the Affidavit of John Johnson dated 
February 6, 2001. R. at 184-265. 
37. Rite Aid never responded to Hillside's motion for summary judgment. See 
Record. 
38. At the relevant hearing, the lower court denied Rite Aid's motion for 
summary judgment. R. at 470-473. At that hearing, the court specifically granted Rite 
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Aid additional time in which to file an opposing memorandum to Hillside's motion for 
summary judgment, but again Rite Aid failed to file any response. R. at 470-473. 
39. When Hillside submitted its motion for summary judgment for decision, 
Rite Aid thereafter filed a motion to strike Hillside's motion. R. at 474-476; 477-479. 
40. The lower court summarily denied Rite Aid's motion to strike, noting that 
Rite Aid's actions were inappropriate and explaining that Rite Aid's motion to strike did 
not "excuse its failure to file a timely response to Hillside's motion." R. at 529-531. 
41. In Rite Aid's own motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits. 
Rite Aid never controverted Hillside's contention that it sent the January 21, 1997 letter 
to Rite Aid's predecessor. R. at 67-74; 75-77; 78-95; 438-468. 
42. On May 31, 2001, the lower court denied Hillside's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, despite Rite Aid never having filed a response, stating that "there are 
factual issues concerning [Rite Aid's] conduct which preclude summary judgment in 
favor of Hillside. R. at 529-531. 
43. At the conclusion of the trial, the lower court specifically concluded that: 
At trial, Hillside relied on the January 21, 1997 letter which, as a 
matter of law, would have been dispositive of the issues at trial in 
favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish that it sent it to Rite Aid's 
predecessor, and that Rite Aid's predecessor had received it. 
R. at 1079; T. at 281-284; R. at 958-967; Conclusions of Law, ^ 2. 
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MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE 
On appeal, Hillside contends that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient 
to support the lower court's decision. Thus, Hillside is obligated to marshal all of the 
evidence purportedly supporting the decision and then show that such evidence cannot 
support the lower court's decision. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 18 (Utah 1988). 
At trial. Rite Aid's evidence consisted primarily of the testimony of four individuals -
Lawrence Gelman, Ellen Long, John Johnson, and Robert Baker - and several letters and 
other documents that were presented as trial exhibits. In looking at the totality of this 
evidence, it is clear that the lower court's decision was not supported by such evidence. 
Robert Baker was called as an expert for Rite Aid to discuss notices in the 
commercial leasing industry, based on his experience as an attorney for Albertson's, a 
grocery chain retailer. He testified that as between landlord and tenant, there are some 
communications that can be characterized as formal, and others as informal. Informal 
communications include items of everyday business, such as the tenant informing the 
landlord that the parking lot needs to be painted. Informal communications can consist of 
writings or telephone calls. Typically, everyday business items do not involve a rush or a 
deadline, nor are there consequences for a failure to act. R. at 1078; Tr. at 134-136. 
Baker testified that, on the other hand, formal communications involve items 
governed by the lease. There are consequences when these kind of notices are not 
provided. Formal notices have to be sent strictly according to the lease requirement for 
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the sending of notices. A lease renewal notice is an example of a formal notice. R. at 
1078; Tr. at 135-36. While all leases have addresses for formal notices, not all leases 
have specific addresses for informal notices. R. at 1078; Tr. at 137. 
Baker testified that, in his opinion, the July 22, 1999 letter from Hillside 
Management to Bernard Reth, landlord liaison for Rite Aid, did not constitute a legal 
notice changing Hillside Plaza, Ltd.'s address for legal notices because it was not sent to 
the correct Rite Aid individual or address set forth in the lease. R. at 1078; Tr. at 138. 
Additionally, Baker stated that in his opinion, Hillside Management's letter of September 
2, 1996 properly changed the address for where rent should be paid but not for any other 
purpose. While that letter states that as of September 2, 1996 "the property management 
responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette 
Johnson of Hillside Management", in Baker's opinion the term "property management 
responsibilities" is unclear and has no generally accepted meaning in the commercial 
leasing industry. R. at 1078; Tr. at 140. This testimony directly controverted Mr. Baker's 
deposition testimony taken a day earlier in which Mr. Baker admitted that the September 
2. 1996 letter did give Rite Aid sufficient notice as to where to send all kinds of notices. 
R. at 1078; Tr. at 145-46. 
Baker further opined that, despite the language of the September 2, 1996 letter. 
Rite Aid was correct in sending its renewal notice to CPMC. R. at 1078; Tr. at 141. 
Furthermore, Rite Aid acted reasonably in doing so, since the September 2 letter only 
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specifically mentions rent but nothing about written formal notices. Finally, Baker stated 
that if Rite Aid did read the September 2 letter incorrectly, in his opinion it was an honest 
mistake. R. at 1078; Tr. at 143. 
In his deposition, Baker testified that as an attorney for Albertson's, it was his 
practice to look through the relevant lease file for a "notice letter" prior to sending a lease 
renewal notice to the landlord. Baker explained that by "notice letter", he meant a letter 
changing the address to which future notice should be sent. Baker testified that he 
considered the September 2, 1996 letter to constitute a "notice letter" properly changing 
Hillside Plaza's address to which future notices should be sent. R. at 1078; Tr. at 144-
146. Despite this testimony, the next day at trial Baker made a sudden about-face, stating 
that since the September 2 letter only mentions rent, in his opinion it was reasonable for 
Rite Aid to send its renewal notice to CPMC. R. at 1078; Tr. at 141. At best, such 
testimony should be disregarded as unreliable. 
Ellen Long testified that at all relevant times, she was the office manager of 
CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 81. Whenever certified mail was delivered to CPMC, the 
receptionist, Donna Brijs, would sign for it, stamp the outside, and bring it to Heather 
Long, who would bring the certified item, unopened, to Ellen Long. R. at 1077; Tr. at 83-
85. At various times, CPMC would receive incorrectly addressed mail relating to 
properties that CPMC no longer managed. R. at 1077; Tr. at 85. Generally, Long would 
forward such mail on to the correct property management companies. Although the 
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forwarding process would continue sometimes for several months, at some point it would 
be discontinued and Long would return such mail to the sender. R. at 1077; Tr. at 85-86. 
It was not typical for Long to continue forwarding mail to the correct addressee for 
a period of years. However, since she and John Johnson were friends, she could have 
continued forwarding mail to him at Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 86, 89. 
Long has no specific recollection as to whether she forwarded Rite Aid's June 21, 
2000 renewal notice on to Hillside Management or whether she returned it to Rite Aid. 
However, she testified that, in her best judgment, she "probably would have" forwarded it 
on to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 90-92. Long is certain that she would not 
have thrown the renewal notice away. R. at 1077; Tr. at 91. 
Lawrence Gelman testified that, as the vice-president and real estate attorney for 
Rite Aid, he personally oversaw the renewal of all of Rite Aid's leases with various 
landlords, including the renewal of the lease at issue in this case. R. at 1077; Tr. at 24, 
26. Gelman testified that the data Rite Aid maintains regarding its landlords is kept in 
various lease files, and that any new contact or notice information regarding said 
landlords is entered into the company's computerized system, known as PIMS. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 30-31, 42-43. 
Gelman also testified that in March of 1997, Rite Aid sent all of its landlords a 
letter, via certified mail, indicating that in the future, the landlords were to send non-legal 
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notices to a rent payables department address, and all legal notices to a separate address. 
R. at 1077; Tr. at 35. 
Gelman stated that he sent various gross sales reports, percentage rent reports, and 
other correspondence and documents to Hillside Management because he did not consider 
those kinds of items to be legal notices but routine management correspondence. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 60. He believed that such items were not part of the administration of the 
lease and the failure to send such items to Hillside would not constitute a default under 
the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 60. 
On July 22, 1999, Hillside Management sent Bernard Reth of Rite Aid a letter. 
The letter stated the following: 
On July 19, 1999,1 received your letter dated July 8, 1999 which you 
incorrectly addressed. I notified Rite Aid of the correct address for Hillside 
Plaza, Ltd. in September 1996. Please update your records to the correct 
mailing address as follows: [Hillside Management address]. 
R. at 1077; Tr. at 53. Gelman testified that, to his knowledge, Mr. Reth did not notify 
Rite Aid that it should send future legal notices to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. 
at 53. Although he did not offer any plausible explanation, Gelman further testified that 
he would not expect Mr. Reth to notify Rite Aid of Hillside Management's request for 
address change, even though Mr. Reth's title was "landlord liaison." R. at 1077; Tr. at 52, 
54. 
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Gelman further testified that on or about June 21, 2000, Rite Aid mailed a notice 
of renewal to Hillside Plaza in care of CPMC at CPMC's address. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36. 
That renewal notice was sent certified mail. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36. Gelman stated that he 
sent the lease renewal notice to CPMC because at the time he reviewed the lease file and 
PIMS systems to determine the letter's destination, the only address on file for Hillside 
Plaza was that of CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36-37. The CPMC address was also the one 
listed as being the current notice address in Rite Aid's PIMS system; Gelman admitted in 
his testimony, however, that Rite Aid's PIMS system is not 100% accurate. R. at 1077; 
Tr. at 66-67. 
Gelman testified that the renewal notice Rite Aid sent on June 21, 2000 had a 
space whereon Hillside was to acknowledge receipt by signing and returning the 
acknowledgment to Rite Aid. R. at 1077; Tr. at 48. Although Gelman admitted that Rite 
Aid never received the acknowledged return, Gelman testified that he ignored that fact 
and was not concerned because Rite Aid seldom receives acknowledgments back from 
landlords. R. at 1077; Tr. at 48-49. 
Exhibiting a similarly cavalier attitude, Gelman testified that at the time he mailed 
the renewal notice, the September 2, 1996 letter from Hillside Management to Rite Aid 
was inside the lease file in front of him but that he did not review that letter for possible 
instructions on where to send the renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39, 43-44, 63-64. 
Had Gelman taken a moment to review the September 2 letter, there can be no question 
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that he would have sent Rite Aid's notice of lease renewal to the proper address. At the 
very least, considering the financial importance of the lease renewal, Gelman certainly 
would have, or should have, inquired about where the notice was to be sent. But he 
simply did not bother to review the letter in the file. Such an admission is equivalent to 
the admission of the lessee's principal in Utah Coal that, having simply missed the 
deadline to exercise the option, ,f'[i]t wasn't for any reason other than I was busy. We 
were busy doing other things in our business, wearing other hats.'" Utah Coal and 
Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100; 40 P.3d 581,1J 4. 
Relying on that very statement, the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Coal concluded that the 
lessee had admitted that "its own negligence caused its exercise [of the option] to arrive 
late. Although the lessee claimed that its conduct was an "honest and justifiable mistake," 
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was negligence and, on that basis, concluded that the 
lessee "is not entitled to equitable excuse." Id. at ^ f 9. 
John Johnson testified that he authored the September 2, 1996 letter to Rite Aid's 
predecessor-in-interest. R. at 1077; Tr. at 97. Johnson testified that while the September 
2 letter asks Rite Aid's predecessor to send future rent payments to Hillside Plaza in care 
of Hillside Management, it did not specifically state that Hillside Plaza's address was 
changing for all purposes or for legal notices or other kinds of mail. R. at 1077; Tr. at 
101. Johnson did not send the September 2, 1996 letter via certified mail as required by § 
24 of the lease. This is because only two of Hillside Management's nineteen tenants at 
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the time had lease provisions requiring legal notices to be sent by certified mail, one of 
which was Rite Aid. R. at 1077; Tr. at 103-04. 
On or about March 21, 1997, Rite Aid sent a letter indicating that, in the future, all 
legal notices should be addressed to one Rite Aid address, and all non-legal notices to 
another. R. at 1077; Tr. at 104-05. The March 21, 1997 letter was sent to CPMC and 
forwarded on to John Johnson at Hillside Management. R. at 1077: Tr. at 104-05. After 
receiving the March 21, 1997 letter, Hillside Management sent various notices to the non-
legal notice address, and some notices to the legal notice address designated therein. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 105. Hillside Management never formally informed Rite Aid that it should 
have sent the March 21, 1997 letter to Hillside Management instead of CPMC. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 105-06, 110. 
In July of 1999, Mr. Bernard Reth of Rite Aid sent a communication to Hillside in 
care of CPMC, which was forwarded on to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 106-
07. Hillside Management responded on July 22, 1999 by telefaxing a letter to Mr. Reth 
and informing him to send all future notices to the Hillside Management address. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 107. Hillside Management never mailed such a letter to the address for legal 
notices specified in Rite Aid's March 21, 1997. R. at 1077; Tr. at 110. Johnson testified 
that after September 2, 1996, Hillside Management received a total of two mail items that 
were forwarded from CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 111. However, he testified that, without 
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any question, he did not receive Rite Aid's renewal notice from CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 
108, 112. 
Johnson testified that Rite Aid is currently paying $2.24 per square foot to rent its 
space in the shopping center. Johnson believed that the market value for the Rite Aid 
space in the year 2000 was around $9.00 to $10.00 per square foot. R. at 1077; Tr. at 
113-14. Johnson is not a corporate officer of Hillside Plaza, Ltd. R. at 1077; Tr. at 118. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's denial of Hillside's motion for summary judgment was improper 
because the state of the record at the time showed it was undisputed Hillside notified Rite 
Aid that Rite Aid needed to send all rent, correspondence, and invoices to the Hillside 
Management address. Thus, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of 
Hillside, and the lower court should have proceeded to hear Hillside's unlawful detainer case. 
Furthermore, the lower court erred in finding for Rite Aid at trial because: (1) the September 
2, 1996 letter gave Rite Aid adequate notice of Hillside's change of address; (2) the totality 
of the evidence shows that Rite Aid knew or should have known where to send the renewal 
notice; and (3) Rite Aid was required to strictly comply with the lease renewal provision and 
is not entitled to equitable relief under the Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. EVEN WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
LOWER COURT, THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S RULING 
As appellant, Hillside first has the duty to marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
lower court's ruling and then demonstrate that such evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the lower court, is insufficient to support the ruling. Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 
1343, 1347 (Utah 1994). To do so, the appellant must "present, in fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" supporting the lower court's findings, and 
"after constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,... ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp.. 29 P.3d 668, 676 (Utah App. 2001). In the 
case at bar, the lower court concluded that, in mailing the lease renewal notice to CPMC, 
Rite Aid sent the notice to the correct address. The evidence supporting this ruling came 
from the testimony of the four Rite Aid witnesses - Robert Baker, Ellen Long, Lawrence 
Gelman, and John Johnson. The testimony of these four individuals, looked at in the light 
most favorable to Rite Aid, fails to support the trial court's ruling. 
A. The Testimony of Robert Baker Was Inadmissible and Fails to Support 
the Lower Court's Ruling. 
Much of the lower court's ruling was based on the testimony of Rite Aid's expert 
witness, Robert Baker. Baker testified that generally, between landlords and tenants, two 
kinds of notices are sent - legal notices and informal communications. Baker testified that 
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informal communications involve items of everyday business, such as the tenant informing 
the landlord that the parking lot needs painting. In Baker's opinion, everyday business items 
do not involve deadlines; nor are there consequences for a failure to timely act. On the other 
hand. Baker viewed formal notices as involving items specifically governed by the lease. 
According to Baker, these latter notices must be set strictly according to the lease 
requirement for sending notices. Baker would classify a lease renewal notice as an example 
of a formal notice. 
Baker testified that the September 2 letter was a formal notice that changed the 
address for where rent should be paid but not for any other purpose. Baker testified that, 
even though the September 2 letter states that "the property management responsibilities for 
[Hillside] have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management", the term 
"property management responsibilities" is unclear and has no generally accepted meaning 
in the commercial leasing industry. Thus, Baker concluded, despite the language of the 
September 2 letter, Rite Aid was correct in sending the lease renewal notice to CPMC, the 
former property management company. The lower court mirrored this reasoning in its 
holding. 
Baker's testimony consisted of two main parts: (1) the adequacy of the September 2 
letter for purposes of changing the address for legal notices; and (2) the adequacy of the 
September 2 letter for purposes of changing the address for rent payments. Whether a legal 
notice complies with lease requirements and the interpretation of legal documents such as 
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notice letters are questions of law to be decided by courts. These items clearly fall outside 
the province of an expert witness, who serves merely to assist the trier of fact in determining 
factual matters outside the scope of knowledge of the average person. See Utah Rule of 
Evidence 702. However, an expert cannot testify as to questions of law, which are normally 
reserved for the exclusive province of the finder of fact. 
Interpretation of a written contract is usually a question of law for the court. 
... Even where some ambiguity exists in the contract, resolution of the 
ambiguity is still a question of law for the court 
Overson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the 
issue of "whether a written notice was adequate" is an issue of law reserved for courts. 
Benton v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 500 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Minn. App. 1993). 
Baker was thus improperly used as an expert witness to testify as to whether the 
September 2 letter gave Rite Aid adequate notice, as required by the lease, of Hillside's 
change of address. That is the court's responsibility. Furthermore, it was not within Baker's 
province to interpret the meaning of terms contained in a legal document. Thus, the lower 
court improperly allowed, and then relied upon, Baker to give an opinion as to his 
interpretation of the notice requirement. Baker's testimony that the term "property 
management responsibilities" contained in the September 2 letter was unclear and had no 
generally accepted meaning in the commercial leasing industry was inadmissible for the 
same reasons. At trial, Hillside objected to Baker's testimony on these issues as calling for 
the ultimate legal conclusion in the case. R. at 1078; Tr. at 142. Because Baker improperly 
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testified regarding obvious questions of law and the ultimate legal decision in this case, his 
testimony should not have been allowed or considered by the lower court. 
Although the testimony of Robert Baker should not have been allowed under the 
circumstances, it should also have been disregarded since Baker was fully impeached at trial. 
On direct examination, Mr. Baker testified that while the September 2 letter properly 
changed the address for where future rent should be paid, it did not adequately change the 
address for any other type of communication. Baker further testified that because the 
September 2 letter was unclear, Rite Aid was correct in sending its renewal notice to CPMC. 
R. at 1078; Tr. at 141. 
This trial testimony directly controverted Mr. Baker's own testimony offered under 
oath just one day earlier in a deposition conducted by counsel for Hillside. At trial, counsel 
for Hillside and Mr. Baker had the following exchange: 
Counsel: "Do you remember giving me precisely the opposite opinion 
regarding Exhibit 3, the September 2, 1996 letter yesterday 
when I asked you about this?" 
Mr. Baker: uNo." 
Counsel for Hillside then gave Mr. Baker a copy of Mr. Baker's deposition. Counsel stated 
that he would read certain questions from the deposition and asked Mr. Baker to read his 
corresponding responses from the witness stand. 
Counsel: "[Y]ou told me that it might be a typical practice when you 
were an attorney for Albertson's to look through the lease file 
prior to sending a lease renewal notice and look for a notice 
letter. Do you recall telling me that?" 
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Mr. Baker: "Yes?" 
Counsel: "What do you mean by a notice letter?" 
Mr. Baker: "It's a letter that changes the address where notices will be 
sent." 
Counsel: "And ... if you were flipping through a lease file and you saw 
[the September 2 letter] would you consider that to be a 
notice letter?" 
Mr. Baker: "Change of address letter?" 
Counsel: uYes." 
Mr. Baker: "Yes." 
R. at 1078; Tr. at 145-146. Just one day before his contradicting trial testimony, Mr. Baker 
testified that the September 2 letter in fact did give Rite Aid adequate notice that Hillside had 
changed its address with respect to all notices, including legal notices such as the lease 
renewal letter later mailed by Rite Aid to CPMC. There appears to be no reasonable 
explanation for the change in Mr. Baker's position, other than the possibility of some after-
the-fact discussions regarding the deposition testimony and its potential effect on the 
outcome of the trial. Counsel for Rite Aid never even attempted to explain this glaring 
contradiction in testimony. In any event, Mr. Baker's testimony was inconsistent, as well as 
inappropriate, with regard to the issues of contract interpretation and the adequacy of the 
September 2 letter. 
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B. The Testimony of Ellen Long Did Not Change the Notice Requirement and 
Fails to Support the Lower Court's Ruling. 
Ellen Long testified that CPMC often received incorrectly addressed mail relating to 
properties CPMC no longer managed. Generally, Long would forward this mail on to the 
correct recipient for some time. After several months, Long would begin to return this mail 
to the sender. Long also testified that Rite Aid sent the lease renewal notice at issue to 
CPMC, although she had no specific recollection as to whether she forwarded the renewal 
notice on to Hillside Management or returned it to Rite Aid. However, because she is a 
friend of John Johnson of Hillside Management, Long testified that she "probably would 
have" forwarded the renewal notice on to Hillside Management, even though CPMC had not 
managed the Hillside property for nearly four years. 
Long's testimony, even when looked at in the light most favorable to Rite Aid, clearly 
lends no support to the lower court's ruling. Long admitted that she had no specific 
recollection of what she actually did with the lease renewal notice. That she "may have" or 
"probably would have" forwarded it on to Hillside Management is simply not enough. John 
Johnson's testimony on cross-examination that he did not receive Rite Aid's lease renewal 
notice until six weeks after the renewal deadline had passed was clear and unambiguous: 
Rite Aid Counsel: And yet less than one year later, you claim that you did 
not receive [the lease renewal notice], correct? 
Johnson: That is not a claim. In fact, I did not receive it. 
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Rite Aid Counsel: Commerce Properties forwarded to Hillside Management Rite 
Aid's Notice of Renewal that's contained in Exhibit 5, didn't 
it? 
Johnson: No. 
Rite Aid Counsel: Are you claiming under oath that Hillside Management did 
not receive that Notice of Renewal? 
Johnson: I am claiming under oath without reservation Hillside 
Management did not receive that notice. 
R. at 1076; T. at 108; 112. Ellen Long's testimony that she "probably would have" sent the 
lease renewal notice on to John Johnson cannot, under any circumstances, overcome John 
Johnson's testimony that, "without reservation Hillside Management did not receive that 
notice." Furthermore, the testimony of Ellen Long does not change the fact that, pursuant 
to the lease and the September 2 letter, Rite Aid was required to send the lease renewal notice 
to Hillside Management. 
C. The Testimony of Lawrence Gelman Did Not Change the Notice 
Requirement and Fails to Support the Lower Court's Ruling. 
Even the most favorable testimony of Lawrence Gelman, Rite Aid's vice president 
and senior real estate attorney, does not support the lower court's ruling that Rite Aid sent 
the lease renewal notice to the correct address. Gelman attempted to renew this Utah lease 
from his office at Rite Aid headquarters in Pennsylvania. Gelman testified that, in 
preparation of renewing the lease, he reviewed Rite Aid's electronic database of lease 
addresses known as PIMS. Gelman also testified that he reviewed portions of the lease file 
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for guidance on where to send the renewal notice. After reviewing PIMS and the lease file, 
Gelman mailed the lease renewal notice to CPMC, the property management company from 
four years earlier. This summarizes all of the favorable testimony from Gelman on the 
subject. 
Gelman's actions directly contradicted both the relevant lease provision for notices 
and the notice given by the September 2 letter. Paragraph 24 of the lease states that only one 
address is to be used for all notices: 
Any notice or demand given or served by either party to this Lease to the 
other shall not be deemed to have been duly given or served unless in 
writing and forwarded by certified or registered mail (return receipt 
requested), postage prepaid, addressed as follows: [Landlord and Tenant 
addresses]. Rent shall be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this 
article. ... The person and the place to which notices are to be mailed may 
be changed by either party by written notice to the other party. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the lease requires that legal notices and rent must be sent to a 
single address. The lease did not allow Hillside to change the address for rent and maintain 
a different address for notices. Nevertheless, that is exactly what the lower court ruled — 
that the September 2 letter changed the address for rent, but not for legal notices. If Rite Aid 
interpreted the September 2 letter as splitting the single Hillside address into two discrete 
addresses, such an interpretation was unreasonable, given the clear directive of paragraph 
24 and Hillside's inability to unilaterally modify that lease requirement. 
The lower court's reliance on Gelman's testimony was also erroneous in light of the 
September 2 letter. In September of 1996, Hillside replaced its property management 
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company, CPMC, with a new property management company, Hillside Management. 
Hillside realized its obligation under paragraph 24 of the Lease to inform all shopping center 
tenants, including Rite Aid, of the management change and the corresponding change in 
mailing address. For this purpose, Hillside Management sent the September 2 letter. 
The September 2 letter began. "Effective September 1, 1996, the property 
management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by 
Annette Johnson of Hillside Management." The letter emphasized that Hillside 
Management "should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants 
of Hillside Plaza," and detailed several property improvements to be overseen by Hillside 
Management. Finally, the letter indicated that Rite Aid should mail future rent payments to 
Hillside Management. Thus, in compliance with paragraph 24 of the lease, the September 
2 letter clearly apprised Rite Aid that the address for notices had changed to the new 
property management company. The language and context of the letter clearly indicate that 
Hillside Management had taken over all of CPMC s responsibilities as property manager, 
which included the collection of rent payments. And again, the testimony of Lawrence 
Gelman was not supportive of the lower court's ruling. The interpretation of paragraph 24 
of the lease and the September 2 letter are questions of law. 
Even if the September 2 letter could be construed as ambiguous or unclear, it at least 
put Rite Aid on notice of a significant change in communicating about the lease. As a 
consequence, anyone acting on behalf of Rite Aid in dealing with the lease was on notice 
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to inquire, particularly in determining where to send an important letter like a lease renewal 
notice. Yet Gelman's best testimony is that he relied on his paralegal's input into the PIMS 
file and documents in the lease file provided by Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest to 
determine where to send the lease renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 30-31; 36-37; 64-67. 
Gelman may or may not have reviewed paragraph 24 of the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 43-45. 
Nor did Gelman search through the lease file for potential change of address notices sent 
pursuant to paragraph 24. R. at 1077; Tr. at 43-46; 64-67. Gelman did not even read the 
September 2 letter, which was in the lease file in front of Gelman at the time Gelman sought 
to renew the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39, 43-44, 63-64. Thus, Gelman's best testimony 
cannot support the lower court's ruling that Gelman sent the lease renewal notice to the 
correct address. 
D. The Testimony of John Johnson Does Not Support the Lower 
Court's Ruling. 
John Johnson, president of Hillside Management, admitted that the September 2 letter 
does not specifically state that Hillside's address was changing for all kinds of notices. 
Johnson also testified that he did not send the September 2 letter by certified mail, as called 
for in the lease. When Rite Aid sent a letter to CPMC in 1997, which was ultimately 
forwarded on to Hillside Management, Johnson did not again inform Rite Aid that the letter 
had been incorrectly addressed. In 1999, Bernard Reth, identified by Rite Aid as the 
landlord liaison for the lease in question, sent a second letter to CPMC, which was also 
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forwarded on to Hillside Management. While Johnson subsequently wrote Reth, informing 
him to send all future notices directly to Hillside Management, Johnson never sent such a 
corrective letter to the address Rite Aid had previously specified for legal notices. Instead, 
he responded directly to Reth's address at Rite Aid. 
The foregoing is all of Johnson's testimony supporting the lower court's ruling. 
While the September 2 letter does not use the specific term "legal notices", it clearly 
indicates that Hillside Management was assuming all property management responsibilities. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, paragraph 24 of the lease requires that rent must be sent to the 
same address used for legal notices. Thus, the omission of the term "legal notices" is 
irrelevant and cannot support the lower court's ruling. 
The fact that the September 2 letter was not sent certified, as called for by paragraph 
3 of the lease, does not render the notice defective. See generally, D. & L. Enters., Inc. v. 
Davenport, 507 P.2d 373 (Utah 1973). Utah courts tend to relax rigid requirements 
governing method of delivery where actual receipt is acknowledged. In D.&L. Enterprises, 
the lessee hand-delivered a notice of intent to renew to the landlord, even though the lease 
specified that such notices should be mailed. The court reversed a summary judgment in 
favor of the lessor, noting: 
The [lessee] says ... [she] gave proper notice of renewal, - with which we 
agree, because it was hand-delivered next door to the place designated for 
such notice, and plaintiffs urgence that it should have been mailed under 
the terms of the lease, recommends itself to a possible absurd result and 
another factual matter as to actual and/or reasonable notice .... 
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Id. at 374. A Washington court faced with virtually identical facts ruled in the same fashion 
in General Tel. Co. v. C-3 Associates. 648 P.2d 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), explaining that: 
[Generally speaking any method of transmission of notice of renewal of a 
lease ma\ be employed which is effective to bring such notice home to the 
lessor and serves the same function and purpose as the authorized method. 
... This is true although the lease requires notice to be made in a particular 
way. 
Id. at 492 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). These cases stand for the proposition that 
an alternative method of notice is valid where it in fact accomplishes the same function or 
purpose as the method authorized in the lease. The primary purpose of sending notices by 
certified or registered mail is "to ensure receipt." Bd. of Comm'rs v. Turner Marine Bulk, 
629So.2d 1278, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, Hillside's failure to adhere to a strict lease 
technicality is immaterial if Rite Aid in fact received the September 2 notice and had an 
opportunity to act on it (i.e. update its address records). 
Rite Aid's receipt of the September 2 notice is undisputed. Lawrence Gelman 
testified that Rite Aid maintained a copy of the September 2 notice in its lease file. R. at 
1077; Tr. at 39,43-44,63-64. From the time it received the notice, Rite Aid had almost four 
years to update its records before the Lease term expired. This would be the case even had 
the notice been sent certified or registered mail. "Where adequate notice is in fact given and 
its receipt is not contested, technicalities of form may be overlooked." Turner Marine, 629 
So.2d at 1283. Because the "function and purpose" of the authorized method of delivery was 
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served and because actual receipt is undisputed, Hillside's September 2, 1996 letter satisfies 
the Lease notice requirement of certified mail. 
Finally, the fact that on the two occasions Rite Aid sent notices to CPMC. Hillside 
Management never sent a notice to Rite Aid's legal notice address informing Rite Aid of the 
mistake, lends no support to the lower court's ruling. Indeed, the September 2 letter, 
contained in Rite Aid's lease file, had already satisfied Hillside's duty to provide notice. 
Moreover, Johnson did mail a response to Bernard Reth, who was identified to Johnson as 
Rite Aid's landlord liaison, asking Reth to update Rite Aid's address file. As discussed 
more fully below, Hillside informed Rite Aid of the correct address on at least twenty 
different occasions. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE, 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 4-501, 
RITE AID RECEIVED NOTICE WHERE IT SHOULD SEND FUTURE 
LEGAL NOTICES 
A. Standard of Review. 
On or about March 16, 2001, Hillside filed a motion for summary judgment which 
the lower court denied. Said motion contained a statement of undisputed facts dispositive 
to Hillside's case. The lower court's decision to deny Hillside's motion was a ruling of law. 
Estate Landscaping & Snow Removal Specialists v. Mountain States Tel, and Telegraph Co., 
844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). This Court should review a lower court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion for summary judgment "for correctness without deference to the trial 
court's ruling." Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. of Davis County School Dist.. 855 P.2d 241. 242 
(Utah 1993). 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Denying Hillside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
On or about December 21, 2000, Rite Aid filed its motion for partial summary 
judgment. R. at 75-77. In response, Hillside filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 
R. at 352-354. The accompanying memorandum served the dual purpose of opposing Rite 
Aid's motion and supporting Hillside's cross-motion. R. at 355-434. As required by Utah 
R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 ("Rule 4-501"), Hillside included in its memorandum a section 
responding to Rite Aid's "undisputed facts." Additionally, Hillside introduced several new 
undisputed facts. Hillside's Undisputed Fact No. 4 included the following text: 
Subsequent to September 2, 1996, Hillside sent Rite Aid or its predecessor-in-
interest seven separate written notices of property management's new and 
substituted address, two of which notices were sent by certified mail. 
Furthermore, the notice dated January 21, 1997 requests Rite Aid's 
predecessor-in-interest to "change your records to send future correspondence 
and invoices to" the new address. 
This fact was supported by a copy of the January 21, 1997 letter, which was attached to the 
Affidavit of John Johnson dated February 6, 2001 as Exhibit "B". R. at 184-265. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-50L Rite Aid was required to "file and serve upon [Hillside] 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and 
all supporting documentation." That deadline passed, and Rite Aid filed nothing. In the 
meantime, the lower court denied Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment. R. at 470-473. 
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However, the lower court specifically granted Rite Aid additional time in which to file a 
memorandum opposing Hillside's motion for summary judgment. Again Rite Aid failed to 
file an opposing memorandum or to controvert Hillside's Undisputed Fact No. 4 in any way. 
When Hillside finally submitted its motion for summary judgment for decision. Rite Aid 
quickly filed a motion to strike Hillside's motion. R. at 474-476; 477-479. The lower court 
summarily denied Rite Aid's motion to strike, noting that Rite Aid's actions were 
inappropriate and explaining that Rite Aid's motion to strike did not "excuse its failure to file 
a timely response to Hillside's motion." R. at 529-531. Nevertheless, the lower court also 
denied Hillside's unopposed motion for summary judgment on the basis that "there are 
factual issues concerning [Rite Aid's] conduct which preclude summary judgment in favor 
of Hillside ...." R. at 529-531. 
Under Rule 4-501, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement." Since Rite Aid never filed a memorandum opposing Hillside's cross-motion, 
then as a matter of law each undisputed fact set forth therein by Hillside must be deemed 
admitted by both parties. This includes Undisputed Fact No. 4, which was properly 
supported by the Affidavit of John Johnson. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-501 it was 
undisputed that on January 21, 1997, Hillside sent Rite Aid's predecessor the above-
referenced letter. 
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Notably, there is nothing in Rite Aid's earlier motion for summary judgment or 
supporting affidavits to contradict Undisputed Fact No. 4. R. at 67-74; 75-77; 78-95. The 
Affidavit of I. Lawrence Gelman, supporting Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment, was 
silent on the matter. The affidavit merely states that: 
The Lease Files for the Property contain nothing dated after March 21, J 997 
instructing Rite Aid (or PLAC [Payless Acquisition Corporation] before it) 
to send notices or other non-rental correspondence to any address other than 
the address at 5282 South 320 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, c/o CPMC. 
R. at 67-74 (emphasis added). Because no evidence was presented to the contrary at trial, 
Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest was deemed to have received the January 21, 1997 letter. 
There is no question that the January 21,1997 letter was a key piece of evidence. At 
the end of the trial, the court stated: 
At trial, Hillside relied on the January 21,1997 letter which, as a matter of law, 
would have been dispositive of the issues at trial in favor of Hillside if Hillside 
could establish that it sent it to Rite Aid's predecessor, and that Rite Aid's 
predecessor had received it. 
R. at 958-967; Conclusions of Law, ^  11 (emphasis added). See also R. at 1079; T. at 281-
284. According to the lower court's own legal determination, Hillside should have prevailed 
on summary judgment nearly ten months earlier. Indeed, Hillside did prove that it sent the 
January 21, 1997 letter to Thrifty PayLess. The testimony contained in the John Johnson 
affidavit was never contradicted by Rite Aid and therefore must be deemed admitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Furthermore, Rite Aid never disputed that its predecessor-in-interest 
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received the letter. Thus, Judge Hanson's own legal determination provides the basis under 
which Hillside should have been awarded summary judgment. 
III. THE CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RITE AID KNEW OR 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WHERE TO SEND ITS RENEWAL NOTICE 
Sometime in 2000, Rite Aid decided to exercise its option to renew the Lease. 
Paragraph 2 of the Lease provides that to do so. Rite Aid must send written notice of its 
intent to renew to Hillside at least 180 days prior to the expiration of the original term. Since 
the original term was to end on January 31, 2001, Rite Aid was required to send its notice of 
renewal to Hillside no later than August 4, 2000. This was not done. Instead, Rite Aid sent 
its notice of renewal letter to CPMC, the property management company from four years 
earlier. This mistake was inexcusable for the following reasons. 
First, at the time Rite Aid sent its lease renewal letter, it maintained a copy of the 
September 2, 1996 letter in its lease file. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39,43-44, 63-64. The lease file, 
containing the September 2 letter, was in front of attorney Lawrence Gelman when he sat 
down to prepare the lease renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 63-67. Second, from 1996 to 
1999, Hillside wrote Rite Aid or its predecessor at least seven separate times informing Rite 
Aid to send items such as future correspondence, invoices, and tax payments to the new 
address and asking Rite Aid to update its records to the correct mailing address. R. at 1078; 
T. at 188-190. During this nearly four-year span, Rite Aid received no correspondence of 
any kind from CPMC. R. at 1078; T. at 191. 
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Third, after the September 2, 1996 letter, Rite Aid mailed at least twelve non-rent 
items including letters, reports, legal notices, and at least sixty (60) rent payments to the 
correct Hillside Management address. R. at 1078; T. at 184-188. This demonstrates that 
Rite Aid knew about the change in property management companies. Hillside Management's 
assumption of the property management responsibilities, and where to send notices. 
Fourth, in June of 2000 Hillside and Rite Aid were embroiled in two lawsuits separate 
from this one, involving interpretation of various Lease provisions (one such case was before 
Judge Henriod and is known as the "percentage rent" case; the other was before Judge 
Hanson and dealt primarily with Rite Aid's selling of merchandise on the sidewalk in front 
of the store — the "non-monetary default" case). R. at 1078; T. at 192-198. In the percentage 
rent case, Rite Aid mailed written demands to the Hillside Management address and served 
upon John Johnson a summons and complaint at Mr. Johnson's home. R. at 1078; T. at 193-
194. On June 20, 2000, one day before Rite Aid sent the lease renewal notice in this case, 
Rite Aid counsel deposed John Johnson, the president of Hillside Management, in the non-
monetary default case. Rite Aid never deposed anybody from CPMC in that case. R. at 
1078; T. at 196-198. 
The reason for deposing John Johnson, rather than anyone from CPMG, was obvious. 
Johnson of Hillside Management was the individual with whom Rite Aid had been dealing 
since September of 1996, when CPMC had ceased management of or involvement with the 
Hillside property. In the midst of the ongoing, heated, percentage rent litigation, Rite Aid 
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never once sent a legal notice to CPMC or deposed a CPMC employee. R. at 1078; T. at 
192-198. This is because Rite Aid knew that CPMC had had no relationship with Hillside 
for almost four years. Yet incredibly, on June 21, 2000, the very day after Johnson was 
deposed in the non-monetary default case. Rite Aid sent its notice of lease renewal to CPMC. 
Finally, even if the evidence is deemed not to have established Rite Aid's actual 
knowledge of where to send the lease renewal notice, the evidence does establish that Rite 
Aid reasonably should have known that the Hillside Management address was the correct 
destination. Hillside Management sent virtually exact replicas of the September 2 letter to 
all of the shopping center's existing tenants, which at the time numbered nineteen. R. at 
1078; T. at 198. All nineteen letters were received by the respective tenants. R. at 1078; T. 
at 199. Of those nineteen tenants, Rite Aid was the only tenant that subsequently failed to 
update its mailing records in response to the September 2 letter. Indeed, none of the other 
eighteen tenants ever exhibited any confusion as to where to send legal notices after 
receiving the September 2 letter. R. at 1078; T. at 203. This demonstrates that, for the 
normal reasonable tenant, the September 2 letter adequately and clearly conveyed the 
message that all future legal notices were to be sent to the Hillside Management address. 
The evidence that Rite Aid was fully involved with Hillside Management, and not 
with CPMC, in the ongoing lease litigation must be viewed in connection with the evidence 
that Rite Aid actually did send at least seventy-two items of mail containing both rent and 
other types of correspondence to Hillside Management between 1996 and 2000. Such 
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continuous dealings with Hillside Management belie the claim that, of nineteen tenants, only 
Rite Aid was ignorant of the import of the notice information provided in the September 2 
letter. When the totality of such evidence is considered, it becomes clear that Rite Aid must 
have actually known, or reasonably should have known, where the lease renewal notice was 
to have been sent. Rite Aid simply mailed the lease renewal notice to the wrong place. 
Therefore, the lower court's decision was not supported by the evidence and must be 
reversed. 
IV. UNDER UTAH LAW, RITE AID MUST STRICTLY COMPLY WITH 
THE LEASE RENEWAL PROVISION AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THIS MATTER 
In Utah, if a tenant wants to exercise an option to renew a lease, it must strictly adhere 
to the relevant renewal provision. Indeed, uwhen [an] optionee decides to exercise his 
option he must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option." 
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) (quoting Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific 
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984)). Furthermore, "the doctrine of 
substantial performance cannot be used to avoid mandatory [option] provisions." Id. at 70-
71. Although substantial compliance is enough to satisfy bilateral contracts, "performance 
of an option requires strict compliance?" Id. (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the Lease required Rite Aid to send written notice of its intention 
to renew to Hillside at least 180 days prior to the expiration of the Lease term. Rite Aid 
failed to strictly comply with the option to renew clause, because Rite Aid mailed the notice 
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to the incorrect address and Hillside received the notice nearly six weeks after the option 
expiration date. (It came six weeks later only because Hillside counsel informed Rite Aid 
counsel, in a separate lawsuit, that the lease had not been renewed. R. at 1078; T. at 173). 
Therefore, under the Geisdorf strict compliance requirement, Rite Aid failed to renew the 
lease. 
Although the rule in Utah is strict compliance with the terms of lease renewal option 
provisions, the Geisdorf Court did leave a small opening in the otherwise explicit strict 
compliance doctrine, explaining that "there are instances in which deviation from strict 
compliance may be equitably excused." Id. at 71. However, Geisdorfdid not "clearly set 
forth when a court should equitably excuse an untimely exercise of an option." Utah Coal 
and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^[11; (Utah 
2001); 40 P.3d 581 (emphasis added). In Utah Coal the Utah Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to do just that, holding that the untimely exercise of an option is excusable only 
in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, mistake, and waiver. Id, at ^ | 
13-14. In the instant case, as in the Utah Coal case, there has been no evidence of fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or waiver, and the only possible basis for 
equitable relief would be the issue of mistake. 
"Mistake" in a non-legal sense, is a broad term that could be defined to mean any 
error, however negligent. Equitable relief, however, should not be available in every 
instance simply because a party has unintentionally or "mistakenly" (in the sense of 
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inadvertently) failed to perform an obligation. For that reason, courts will not apply equity 
to excuse tardy lease renewals "where the lessee's negligence, inadvertence, or neglect 
caused the failure ...." 40 P.3d 581 at ^ f 14. Indeed, "the consequences of a lessee's failure 
to exercise an option, however uncomfortable they may be, are self-inflicted. Equitable 
relief should not be used to extricate the lessee from the consequences brought about by the 
lessee's own actions." Id.. In the case at bar, Rite Aid's problems were "self-inflicted" and 
"brought about by the lessee's own actions." Hence, Rite Aid does not meet any of the 
criteria for equitable relief. Id. 
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RITE AID ITS 
ATTORNEY FEES 
A. Rite Aid Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because Hillside Did Not Violate 
the Lease Agreement. 
Rite Aid is not entitled to attorney fees or costs under the relevant governing lease 
provision. Paragraph 23 of the Lease states that "costs, including attorneys' fees, of any 
action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by the 
party adjudged by the court to have violated any of the terms or provisions of this Lease" 
(emphasis added). In Utah, courts tend to construe contractual attorney fee provisions very 
narrowly. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Thus, a 
"prevailing party" or "party not in default" is not automatically entitled to attorney fees if 
such language is not expressly included within the governing instrument. Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
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In the present case, the lower court awarded Rite Aid its attorney fees on the basis that 
Hillside "violated the lease terms by contesting the validity of Rite Aid's renewal notice and 
taking steps to evict Rite Aid from the premises through an unlawful detainer action." R. at 
970-974. However, that finding was not based on any specific lease provision and, in fact, 
was directly contrary to the evidence presented at trial. There is no such evidence that 
Hillside "violated any terms or provisions of this Lease." In fact, Hillside did not receive a 
timely lease renewal notice. Rite Aid was unlawfully detaining the premises. Simply 
challenging the effectiveness of Rite Aid's renewal (which came six weeks late) did not 
constitute the violation of any specific lease term. Such action may have inconvenienced 
Rite Aid, but it did not violate Rite Aid's ability to peacefully possess the premises while the 
litigation progressed. Indeed, Hillside never interfered with the day-to-day operations of the 
Rite Aid store. Rite Aid has never claimed that it suffered from decreased customer inflow 
or profits or that it sustained any other injury or damage on account of Hillside's actions. 
Because Hillside did not violate any specific lease term, the lower court should not have 
ordered Hillside to pay Rite Aid's attorney fees and costs. 
B. Rite Aid's Claimed Attorney Fees Are Unreasonable and Excessive. 
The lower court also erred in the amount of fees awarded. Throughout the entire 
litigation, Rite Aid employed the services of both Bruce Wycoff, of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough, and Cyndi Meyer, of Morgan, Meyer & Rice, both litigators and partners at 
two established law firms. Shortly after trial, Rite Aid's combined counsel had billed 529.25 
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hours, for a total bill of $85,511.75. R. at 1006-1110. However, Rite Aid is not 
automatically entitled to all attorney fees it billed in litigating this case, especially if the 
number of hours billed is unreasonably high. Indeed, "what an attorney bills or the number 
of hours spent on a case is not determinative" of how much attorney fees to award an 
attorney. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). Instead, a court should 
consider "[h]ow much of the work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the 
matter." Id. at 316 (emphasis added). 
In determining whether the number of hours billed is reasonable, a court may consider 
such factors as "the difficulty of the litigation" and "the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case". Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). Another useful 
tool in determining reasonableness could be to compare hours billed by opposing law firms. 
Rite Aid clearly fails each of these tests, which supports Hillside's contention that Rite Aid's 
requested attorney fees are unreasonable. 
1. The Litigation Was Not Complex. 
This case does not encompass complex or novel legal issues. The primary issue was 
merely whether Rite Aid, in context of the governing lease document, properly exercised its 
option to renew the lease. The documentation at issue consisted of a lease agreement, several 
items of correspondence, and some documents from Rite Aid's lease and computer files. 
Both parties had early access to all of the key documents in the case, and the lower court was 
merely asked to interpret those documents. Early in the case, both sides filed motions for 
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summary judgment, determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact. 
Litigation only required counsel to have a working knowledge of contract law and 
commercial leases. 
Nor did this case present unique legal issues. At least three recent Utah cases 
involved similar fact patterns and issues. One such case, Geisdorf v. Doughty, was decided 
before this litigation ensued. Two other cases interpreting and expanding on Geisdorfwere 
certainly relevant when decided, but could not have reasonably caused Rite Aid to drastically 
modify its trial strategy or delay in finding a suitable expert witness. 
2. The Use of Two Law Firms Was Inefficient. 
Rite Aid used its legal resources inefficiently by employing the services of two major 
law firms. From the outset of this case, both Ms. Meyer and Mr. Wycoff, and their 
respective firms, served as local counsel for Rite Aid. It is true that a party in a lawsuit may 
hire as many law firms as it wishes. Indeed, Rite Aid could have hired five law firms to 
assist in this case. Perhaps utilizing several minds from several firms could have improved 
upon the presentation of Rite Aid's claims. However, while utilizing five firms may have 
constituted a valid trial strategy, it would be unreasonable to claim reimbursement for all 
such attorney fees from Hillside. 
In short, there was nothing inherently wrong with Rite Aid bringing in Mr. Wycoff 
and his firm to assist Ms. Meyer in this litigation. Mr. Wycoff had an existing relationship 
with Rite Aid and had certain expertise in matters involving landlord/tenant issues. R. at 
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1006-1010. However, Ms. Meyer had already shown her ability to represent Rite Aid's 
interests as sole local counsel. Indeed, prior to this case Ms. Meyer and her firm had already 
handled two other cases involving these same parties. Hillside should not have to bear the 
expense of a second law firm. 
3. Rite Aid Incurred More Attorney Fees Than Hillside. 
Another test to determine the reasonableness of attorney fees is to compare the fees 
incurred by opposing law firms in the same case. In this case, both parties faced identical 
issues. Both parties had access to the same documents. Yet counsel for Rite Aid billed 88.25 
hours more than counsel for Hillside. R. at 1006-1010. Rite Aid's attorney fees total 
$85,511.75, one and a half times more than Hillside's attorney fees of $58,297.60. R. at 
1006-1010. These numbers are a result of Rite Aid's inefficient and unreasonable use of two 
law firms and two senior partners. Hillside should not have to bear the added expense of two 
law firms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the lower court erred in denying 
Hillside's motion for summary judgment, hold that the order of the lower court be reversed, 
and grant summary judgment in favor of Hillside. In the alternative, the Court should rule 
that Rite Aid had adequate notice of Hillside's new address but failed to timely and properly 
renew, and remand the proceedings to the lower court to allow Hillside to litigate its unlawful 
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detainer action. Finally, the Court should reverse the lower court's award of attorne\ fees 
to Rite Aid. 
DATED this ^_ day of June 2003. 
KESLER & RUST 
rcer 
Ry^tjT^Fiancey 
Attorneys for Hillside Plaza. Ltd. 
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THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the 
day of Mav 5 , 1974, between HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 
a partr.ersnip. ("Landlord"), and SKAGGS COMPANIES. INC.. a Delaware 
Corporation, ("Tenant") , and is the lease agreement referred to in that certain 
lease of even date herewith between the parties hereto covering the premises 
(the "Premises") at 70tn South and 23rd East, Salt Lake County, Utah, consisting 
of the outlined land area shaded in red and marKed "Skaggs" on tne plot plan 
attached to said lease as Exnibit "A" which is located in the snooping center, 
(the "Shopping Center1) , the present boundaries of whicn are described on 
Exhibit "B" attached to said lease. This lease agreement is made to supplement 
and complete such lease and is to be aeemed a material part thereof for all 
purposes and to tne same extent as if actually and fully set fortn therein (such 
lease and this lease agreement being heremaiter collectively referred to as 
the "Lease"). 
(1) PRELIMINARY TERM RENT. No rent shall be due or payable 
during the preliminary term of this Lease except such as may be due pursuant 
to the article entitled "COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM." 
(2) ANNUAL RENT. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord during the 
original term of this Lcdse *u annual rent of Fuly-Four Thousand Six Hunarea 
Dollars ($54,600) in equal monthly installments of Four Thousand Five 
Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($4,550) payable on or before the tenth day of each 
calendar month for the current calendar montn. The annual rent installment 
for any fractional calendar month at the beginning of the original term shall 
be prorated and paid or. or before the tenth day of the calendar month following 
commencement at the original term. 
(3) PERCENTAGE RENT. On or before the first day of March 
following each calendar year of the original term of this Lease, Tenant agrees 
to mail or deliver to Landlord a statement, signed by one of its officers, showing 
the acrual sales (computed as neremaiter provided) made m or from the Premises 
during such year. 
Should said sales as so computed exceed the minimum sales ba^e 
of Three Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($3 ,640 ,000) m any 
calendar year, Tenant agrees to pay Landlord as additional rent due hereunder 
a sura equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of such excess. Payment 
of such percentage rent, if any, shall be made on or before Marcn 1st of each 
year for the preceding calendar year. 
In computing its sales for purposes of this article, Tenant bhall 
include the total gross amount realized as the result of retail bales of merchandise 
and services rendered by Tenant and its successors, subsidiaries or affiliated 
corporations in or irom the Premises, except thdt there snail not be included 
in such computation tne following. (1) the purcnase price of all returned mcrchan 
dise wnich is refunded or credited to the purchaser; (2) all receipts (including 
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rent to be received from such reletting and such rent shall not be promptly 
paid to Landlord by the new tenant, Tenant shall immediately be liable to pay 
such deficiency to Landlord. If Landlord elects to terminate this Lease, written 
notice to that eriec: specitying the elfective date of termination shall be given 
by Landlord to Tenant and in such event, Landlord may recover from Tenant 
all damages Landlord may incur by reason oi Tenant's failure to pay rent, 
including the cost of recovering tne Premises and including the excess of the 
annual rent reserved in this Lease for tne remainder of the original term (or 
any extended term men in effect) over the then reasonable rental value of 
the Premises for tne remainder of such term, all of which amounts shall be 
immediately due ana pa>able by Tenant to Landlord. 
(23) COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enlorce any of the terms or provisions 
of tins Lease, shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have violated 
any of the terms or provisions of this Lease 
(24) NOTICES AND PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF RENT Any notice 
or demand given or served by either party to tnis Lease to the other shall 
not be deemed to have been duly given or served unless m writing and forwarded 
by certified or registered mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
To the Landlord at: 351 California Street 
San Francisco, California 94104 
To the Tenant at: Post Office Box 658 
Salt Laxe City, Utah 84110 
Rent snail be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this 
article. No successor to Landlords interest shall be entitled to receive rent 
payments until Tenant shall have been turnished with (a) a letter signed by 
the grantor of sucn interest setting forth the name and address of the person 
entitled to receive such rent and (b) a photostatic copy of tne deed or other 
instrument by whicn such interest passed. 
The person and the place to wnich notices are to be mailed may 
be changed by either party by written notice to the otljer party 
(25) PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. Landlord agrees to construct 
a building on the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved 
in writing by Tenant but prepared at Landlord's expense. Tenant snail cooperate 
with Landlord in the furnishing of all necessary information, plans and sketches 
to show Tenant's requirements for such building. It on or before October 1, 1974, 
final plans and specifications have not been approved by Tenant, Landlord or 
Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to tne other party Upon 
approval in writing of :\nal plans and specifications by Tenant, Landlord shall ob-
tain a ouilding permit and diligently oroceed with the construction of the building 
on the Premises. If such construction is not commenced on or before January 
1, 1975, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord. 
If such construction is commenced prior to approval in writing by Tenant of 
final plans and specifications, Tenant may at any time prior to the commencement 
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Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84090 
80L947-9130 
September 2> 1996 
Christopher Sloan 
Property Accounting 
Thrifty PayLess, Inc. 
9275 S W Peyton Lane 
Wilsonville, OR 97070 u/>* ^ 
Re Hillside Plaza^hoppijig Center 
PayLess St* 
Dear Ms. Hammer, 
Eflfectivc September I, 1996, the property management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza 
Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management With 
the organization of Hillside Management, and with the assignment of this responsibility to 
Annette, we should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants 
of Hillside Plaza. Annette can be reached at 801-947-9130 
For the roonth of Seprember, 1996, Commerce Properties Management Corp. will forward 
your rental payment to Hillside Management Please mail your future rent payments as 
follows 
Hillside Plajza Shopping Center 
c/o Hillside Management 
PO Box 900511 
Sandy, UT 84090 
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with the terms of your lease and must 
be received no later than the due date specified in your lease. 
You may be aware that the ownership of Hillside Plaza has recently refinanced its loan for 
the shopping center In accordance with the terms of this new loan, several capital 
improvement and repair projects will be underway during this faB and next spring The 
most significant capita] improvement projects include* the planned addition of new sign 
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the plaza area. At this time architect?, are in the process of designing, the renovations. 
Upon completion of tie planning phase .we will encourage interested tenants to review the 
plans. The most significant repair projects rachide: parking lot work; roof work; and 
landscape improvements scheduled for next spring. We win make every effort to minimize 
any inconvenience these projects may present for tenants and shopping center patrons. 
Your input will be welcome both now and curing the coursfc of the projects. We are 
certain you will be please with the encj result. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If Annette can be of assistance in any wayr 
please do hot hesitate.to contact her. 
Sincerely, 
JbhriS. Johnson 
Asset Manager* • 
c. RobBirdsley 
Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, UT 84090 
January 21, 1997 
Lu Strong 
Thrifty Payless 
9275 SW Peyton Lane 
Wilsonville, OR 97070 
Re: Hillside Plaza, Salt Lake City, UT 
Store m530 
Dear Mr. Strong, 
Please be advised that as of September 1, 1996, Hillside Plaza is under new management. 
The ownership has not changed nor any contractual agreements by Hillside Plaza Please 
change your records lo send mttiie coirespondence and invoices to 
Hillside Plnza 
c/o Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, UT 84090 
801947 9130 






> MAILING ADDRESS 
P.O. Box 1169 
Camp Hill, PA 17001-1169 
D ! . . . . ^ .. • OFFICE ADDRESS 
Rite Aid Corporation 45!
 s s t J o h n s R d 
Camp Hill, PA 17001 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
•(717)730-8271 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Z 075 085 574 
07/08/1999 
HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD 
C/O COMMERCE PROP. ,GMT. CORP. 
5 2 S 2 SOUTH, 320 WEST, SUITE 'D 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84107 
Re: RITE AID #06143 
HILLSIDE PLAZA S/C 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
Dear Property Manager: 
The above referenced Rite Aid store was told by the Salt Lake City Fire Marshall to have the fire lane 
marked (painted) and approriate signs posted. They were given two weeks (from 7/7/99) to have this 
completed. The lease states that the Landlord is responsible for Common Area Maintenance, such as 
this. Please make arrangements to have this completed no later than 7/21/99. 
I appreciate your prompt attention to this matter and request notification when conditions have been 
corrected. Should you have any questions or follow up comments, feel free to contact me at (717) 730-
8343 or fax (717) 975-8695. 
Sincerely 
.eerrjafd E. Rdth 
indlord Liaison 
cc Local Construction Manager 
Market Manager #00028 
Eve Bear, Esquire 




P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, UV 84090 
801-947-9130 
July 22, 1999 
Store #06143 VIA FACSIMILE ONLY U 717975-8695 
c/o Rite Aid Corporation 
Attn Bernard E. Reth 
POBox 1169 
Camp Hill, PA 17001-1169 
Re: I lillside Plaza Shopping Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Reth, 
On July 19, 1999, I received your letter dated July 08, 1999, which you incorrectly 
addressed. I notified Rite Aid of the correct address for Hillside Plaza, Ltd in September 
1996. Please update your records to the correct mailing address as follows 
Hillside Plaza, Ltd. 
c/o Hillside Management 
POBox 900511 
Sandy, UT 84090 
Please provide a copy of the notice from the Salt Lake Cily Fire Marshall wherein Rite 
Aid was told to have the fire lane painted The fire lane has existed in front of the 
premises with a painted red curd for nearly 25 years. Two other stores of similar and 
larger size also occupy space at the shopping center with identical painted curbs. Neither 
of the other stores report contact by the fire department directing repainting of their fire 
lanes. In fact, I repainted the fire lanes at the entire shopping center less than a year ago. 
The fire department has not contacted me although the fire department knows that I have 
an office at the shopping center and that I represent the landlord 
I believe the fire department is simply responding to your current store manager's defiance 
of fire codes that prohibit parking and deliveries in fire lanes marked with red curbs. I 
have also attempted to correct this problem through direct contact with your store 
manager and delivery drivers, and newsletters delivered to your store. When those efforts 
were unsuccessful I attempted to call your store manager's supervisor without receiving a 
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returned call On May 20, 1999, I included this issue and other site based lease violations 
in written correspondence addiessed to Allan Henning in Rite Aid's audit depaitment I 
have attached an excerpt from my May 20, 1999, letter addressing site based lease 
violations Rite Aid personnel at all levels have refused or ignored all of my elTorts to gain 
Rite Aid's compliance When I received your letter I had already consulted Hillside 
Plaza's attorney regarding a notice of default to Rite Aid addressing this and other RJte 
Aid lease violations I have now directed Hillside's attorney to delay issuance of that 
notice pending the outcome of this conespondence 
I believe you can resolve the fire lane problem with proper direction to your store manager 
prohibiting his use of the fire lane as a delivery and loading zone I sincerely hope as a 
Landlord Liaison you will contact me to correct the other Rite Aid lease violations so that 
legal action will not be necessary 
f will be out of my office from July 23, 1999, through July, 31, 1999 1 look forward to 
discussing these issues with you afiei August I, 1999 
Sincerely, 
John S Johnson 
Asset Manager 
_ _ , / I W ^ RO,BOX316S 
* v a s Mj/F i r~ mtFJ)fW§S/mrmrm Hamsburg. PA 17105 
LEGAL DBttRTMENT • GENERAL OFFICE 
30 Hunter Lane 
Camp Hill, PA 17011 
• (717) 761-2633 
•(717) $75-5*52 Fax 
June 21, 2000 VIA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R. 
Z 403 484 907 
Hillside Plaza Ltd. 
c/o Commerce Property Management Corp. 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Re: Rite Aid #5143 
23,78 East 7000 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Gentlemen; 
Please be advised that THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. hereby elects to exercise its option to 
renew the Lease for the referenced premises. Our new terra will commence upon the expiration 
of the present term, to wit: on or about February 1, 2001. 
Kindly acknowledge your receipt of this notice by signing in the space provided below 
and returning a copy of this letter in the postage paid envelope enclosed. 
Very truly yours, 
THRIFTY RAYLESS, INC. 
I. Lawrence Gelman 
Vice President and Seen 
ELG:mh 
Acknowledged: 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a 




HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
a Utah general partnership, 
Defendants. 
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a 
California corporation, dba 
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG 
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The Court has before it a request for decision filed by 
defendant Hillside seeking a ruling on its cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The parties in this matter appeared before the Court on 
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March 26, 2001, in connection with the plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. At that time, the Court noted that 
defendant Hillside had a pending cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
However, the Court determined that this Motion was not ripe for 
consideration because the other parties had not had an adequate 
opportunity to respond to the Motion. After hearing argument on 
the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court 
denied it after determining that there were factual issues 
concerning Rite Aid and its predecessors' conduct following the 
September 2, 1996, notice, and whether this conduct was consistent 
with an interpretation of the September 2nd notice as only being 
operative with respect to rental payments, as opposed to all other 
forms of notice. 
Hillside filed its Notice to Submit on April 10, 2001, 
indicating that its Motion for Summary Judgment is unopposed. On 
April 12, 2001, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Hillside's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that in light of the Court's 
ruling at the March 26, 2001, hearing, Hillside's Motion must 
necessarily be denied (stricken) . Hillside responded to the Motion 
to Strike on April 16, 2001. 
Since the Court did not rule on Hillside's Motion at the March 
26, 2001, hearing, that Motion remained pending and should have 
been responded to in a reasonable period of time. The plaintiff's 
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Motion to Strike based on the presumption that the Court would 
necessarily deny Hillside's Motion is inappropriate and does not 
excuse its failure to file a timely response. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike is denied. 
The Court next considers Hillside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Although this Motion is technically unopposed, the Court 
nevertheless denies the Motion because there are factual issues 
concerning the plaintiff's conduct with respect to differentiating 
correspondence based on its content after the September 2, 1996, 
notice, which precludes summary judgment in favor of Hillside. 
Accordingly, Hillside's Motion is denied. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court 
for review and signature. 
Dated this day of May, 2001. 
- * 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
B 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 7 2002 
% ^W^fe cogwn-
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
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HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
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CASE NO. 000910098 
The Court has before it two issues pending requiring 
resolution relating to appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and attorney's fees. 
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Hillside has filed an Objection to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Rite Aid. Hillside has 
submitted its own version of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Court has reviewed the Objections, the Response thereto, 
as well as the respective Findings, and is satisfied that the 
Objections Hillside has lodged are not well-taken and should be 
overruled. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
Rite Aid are consistent with the ruling this Court made following 
the evidentiary portion of this trial. 
The Court has signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law prepared by Rite Aid on a date contemporaneous with the date of 
this Minute Entry decision. 
The second issue, as noted above, concerns the entitlement to 
attorneyfs fees. Rite Aid seeks attorney's fees, and Hillside 
argues that Rite Aid is not entitled to attorney's fees because 
under the lease agreement while Rite Aid may have prevailed, 
Hillside was not "adjudged by the court to have violated any of the 
terms or provisions of its lease.1' Rite Aid contends that Hillside 
violated the lease terms by contesting the validity of Rite Aid's 
renewal notice and taking steps to evict Rite Aid from the premises 
through an unlawful detainer action. The Court agrees with the 
analysis of Rite Aid and is satisfied that Hillside has violated 
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the terms or provisions of the lease through its actions referred 
to by Rite Aid and is therefore entitled to attorney's fees. 
It appears there is a question as to the reasonableness of the 
fees sought. Counsel for Rite Aid has filed his Affidavit which 
includes an hourly itemization of the fees requested. The Court 
also has the Affidavit of Cynthia K.C. Meyer regarding attorney's 
fees and costs that also include an hourly itemization. Hillside 
objects to the amount of fees on the basis that the amounts sought 
are not clearly delineated as to the work being performed and 
further indicates that the amount charged, even if the work was 
actually accomplished, is more than is justified in this case. The 
Court is satisfied that a hearing will be required to determine the 
amount of fees, wherein should Hillside's counsel wish to cross-
examine either Ms. Meyer or Mr. Wycoff regarding the attorney's 
fees they have requested, he may do so. The Court takes the 
Affidavits filed by Mr. Wycoff and Ms. Meyer as establishing prima 
facie entitlement to the fees requested. The burden will then be 
upon counsel for Hillside to demonstrate inappropriateness of the 
bills through cross-examination or other testimony at such an 
evidentiary hearing. 
A Notice of said hearing is enclosed. The Court has set aside 
two hours for this hearing, which would include not only testimony 
sought to be elicited and cross-examination to be performed, but 
THRIFTY PAYLESS V. 
HILLSIDE PLAZA PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
also any final remarks of counsel regarding the reasonableness of 
the fees. The question of entitlement has already been answered. 
Counsel for plaintiff Rite Aid is to prepare an Order in 
conformity with this Minute Entry decisaon, and submit the same to 
the Court for review and signature i*l accordance with the Code of 
Judicial Administration. / 
Stephen G. Morgan (No. 2315) 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer (No. 5050) 
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE, L.C. 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Facsimile: (801) 531-9732 
Bruce Wycoff (No. 4448) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a : 
California corporation d/b/a/ : 
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG 
STORES, INC., an Illinois : 
corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
The Court conducted a bench trial of this matter beginning 
March 18, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Thrifty Payless, Inc. 
("Thrifty")and Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite Aid"), along with 
Counterdefendant American Drug Stores ("ADS"), appeared personally 
and through their counsel of record, Cynthia K. C. Meyer of Morgan, 
Meyer, and Rice, L.C., and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough. Defendant/Counterclaimant, Hillside Plaza, Ltd. 
("Hillside") , appeared personally and through its counsel of 
record, Scott 0. Mercer and Ryan Hancey, of Kesler 6c Rust. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having 
observed their demeanor and credibility, having carefully read the 
trial memoranda submitted by the parties, and being fully apprised 
in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
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Parties 
1. Thrifty is a California Corporation with it principal 
place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 
2. Rite Aid is a Delaware Corporation with its principal 
place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 
3. Thrifty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Rite Aid 
Corporation. (Hereafter, the Court will refer to Thrifty and Rite 
Aid collectively as "Rite Aid"). 
4. Hillside is a California limited partnership that 
regularly conducts business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates 
("HPA"), as landlord, entered into a written Lease Agreement (the 
"Lease"), with Skaggs Companies, Inc. ("Skaggs"), as tenant, in 
which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East 7000 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property") 
6. Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Skaggs. 
7. Hillside is the successor-in-interest to HPA. 
8. ADS, a previous successor-in-interest to Skaggs, 
guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to, 
assignees of, or subtenants under, its interests. 
Factual Background 
9- The original Lease term began on October 6, 1975, and was 
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to expire on January 31, 2001 unless Rire Aid gave Hillside timely 
written notice of Rite Aid's intent ro renew the Lease. 
10. At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired 
Commerce Properties Management Corporation PCPMG") to perform 
property management functions for the Property. 
11. On March 19, 1992, CPMG sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit 
2) giving Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice: 
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and 
other mail to our former address. Effective March 20, 
1992 our brokerage company is moving from their location 
at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In the 
future all rental payments and mail for [CPMG] should be 
addressed as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Limited 
Commerce Properties Management Corp. 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(Emphasis added) 
12. On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management, an assumed name 
of an entity legally distinct from Hillside, which has no common 
owners, sent a form letter (^Hillside's 1996 Letter") (Trial 
Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest. Trial Exhibit 3 
recites that >Nthe property management responsibilities for Hillside 
Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of 
Hillside Management." Exhibit 3 contained the following notice: 
For the month of September, 1996, [CPMG] will forward 
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your rental payment to Hillside Management. Please 
mail your future rent payments as follows: 
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center 
c/o Hillside Management 
P.O. Box 900511 
Sandy, Utah 84 090 
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with 
the terms of your lease and must be received no later 
than the date specified in your lease. 
(Emphasis added) 
13. Although Exhibit 3 was not sent by registered or 
certified mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and 
acted on the letter soon after September 2, 1996, and placed the 
letter in its lease file. 
14. Unlike Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 gave no change of address 
instructions for NXmail" or ^ other mail". It expressly limited the 
address change to xxrent" and NNrental" payments. 
15. In fact, by the date of Exhibit 3, Hillside had relieved 
CPMG of all property management duties, and had transferred all 
those duties to Hillside Management, a legally separate entity from 
Hillside. 
16. On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside, requesting 
that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all 
future non-leaal correspondence such as billings be sent to a 
different address. (Trial Exhibit 4) 
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17. Because Exhibit 4 was a legal notice, Rite Aid sent it to 
the address it had used for general, non-rental, mail before 
receipt of Exhibit 3: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Ste 
D, Salt Lake City, Utah 841070000. 
18. Rite Aid's legal notice regarding its change of address 
reached Hillside shortly after March 21, 1997. 
19. The Lease further provides, at 1(2): 
OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the 
term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and 
additional consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each 
such extension shall be exercised by giving written 
notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the 
expiration of the original term hereof or any such 
extended term. Upon such exercise, this Lease and the 
Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended without 
the execution of any further lease of other instrument. 
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite 
Aid's exercise of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4, 
2000, the date 180 days before January 31, 2002. 
20. Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via 
certified mail, return receipt requested, its notice of renewal of 
the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the same address it had used for its 
March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4): Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 
320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107. 
21. CPMG received the letter on June 29, 2000. 
22. CPMG personnel "probably" or "likely" forwarded Exhibit 
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5 to Hillside Management. 
23. Sometime after the August 4, 2001 renewal date had 
passed, Hillside, through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel, 
Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to exercise the Option as 
the Lease required. 
24. Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from 
Annette Johnson of Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's 
predecessor-in-interest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter") . 
25. At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that 
Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite 
Aid or to anyone else. 
26. Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or 
justifying Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial. 
27. The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of 
the January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its 
burden of proving that Hillside Management sent that letter* As a 
result, the Court will disregard it. 
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements 
28. In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to 
change the mailing address for all purposes from CPMG to Hillside 
Management; Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention. 
29. Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August: 
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4, 2000, the deadline for Rite Aidfs Option exercise. 
30. Because it changed the address for legal notice only on 
its PIMS system, leaving the address for other correspondence 
unchanged, it is clear that Rite Aid' s predecessor-in-interest read 
Exhibit 3 as changing the address for rent and rent-related 
activities only, leaving unaffected the address contained in 
Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and rent-related 
activities. 
31. It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for 
landlords and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various 
types of correspondence. 
32. The Phrase "property management7' does not have any 
standard or generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing 
industry. 
33. The phrase "property management" may or may not mean 
"all" activities involving the managed property. 
34. Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really 
small moment 'whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to 
sending Exhibit 5, because Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the 
address for "rent", and not to other types of correspondence, and 
therefore changed the address for rent only. 
35. Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only 
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the address for rent and rent-related correspondence was 
reasonable. 
36- Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid 
should be charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's 
unexpressed intent. 
37. It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management 
to have a written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed 
the address for all types of notice; indeed its purported January 
21, 1997 Letter accomplished that purpose-
38. The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that 
it repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy 
post office box address because such correspondence was rent-
related/ and in many cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit 
monies to the listed address. 
39. To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the 
address it was using, Hillside provided no explanation of its 
failure ever to send any change of address notice to Rite Aid at 
the address it had specified in Exhibit 4 as applying to legal 
notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box 3165, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania). 
Mistake 
40. Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner 
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inconsistent wirh Hillside Management's intention. 
41. Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3. 
42. The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only 
with xxrent" or ^ rental". 
43. Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion 
inherent in Exhibit 3. 
44. It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge 
Rite Aid with knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind. 
45. To the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong 
address, that error was the result of a honest and justifiable 
mistake in interpreting Exhibit 3. 
46. No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in 
exercising the Option to renew the Lease. 
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Having made the foregoing factual findings, the Court has 
determined that they support the following legal conclusions, or 
that it is appropriate to make the following conclusions as a 
matter of law: 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
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2. At trial, Hillside relied on The January 21, 1997 Letter 
which, as a matter of law, would have been dispositive of the 
issues at trial in favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish 
that it sent it to Rite Aidf s predecessor, and that Rite Aid's 
predecessor had received it. 
3. The burden is on Hillside to show that Hillside 
Management sent the January 21, 1997 Letter; the burden is not on 
Rite Aid to show that Hillside Management did not send it or that 
Rite Aid's predecessor did not receive it. 
4. There is no presumption of mailing; to the contrary the 
law is explicit regarding the evidence necessary to establish 
mailing. 
5. The January 21, 1997 Letter is legally entitled to no 
weight. 
6. The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's 
option to renew the Lease (the "Option") therefore rises or falls 
with Exhibit 3. 
7. As the January 21, 1997 Letter shows, Hillside 
Management, as the agent for Hillside, had the ability to express 
in Exhibit 3 with reasonable clarity what Hillside Management 
intended. 
8. Nothing in the Lease prevented Rite Aid or Hillside in 
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having multiple addresses for different purposes. 
9. Rite Aid was obligated to strictly comply with the 
Lease's Option and renewal provisions. 
10. By sending Exhibit 5 to the address it did, Rite Aid 
strictly complied with the Lease's Option and renewal provisions; 
if Rite Aid had sent Exhibit 5 to Hillside Management at the 
address shown in Exhibit 3, Hillside could have argued that Rite 
Aid had not strictly complied with Exhibit 3. 
11. Exhibit 3 does not substantially comply with the Lease's 
provisions for changing the address for legal notices because it 
changes the address for rent only. 
12. Alternatively, to the extent Rire Aid was mistaken in its 
interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused 
under the foregoing factual circumstances. 
13. Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous. It says send rent payments 
to the new address. Rite Aid did that. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Rite Aid effectively renewed the Lease for an additional 
five-year term. 
2. Rite Aid is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession 
532686v2 12 
of the Property to the extent set forth in the Lease. 
3. Hillside shall take nothing by its Complaint- All claims 
that Hillside raised, or could have raised through the date of the 
trial in this matter, are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. 
4. The Third District Court Clerk shall immediately release 
all cash or possession bonds Rite Aid has filed or deposited with 
the Clerk in connection with these consolidated actions. 
5. The Court expressly reserves ruling on Rite Aid's 
entitlement to attorney fees, and amount of those fees, until Rite 
Aid has properly brought the matter before the Court pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-505. 
6. Pursuant to ProMax Development Corp. v. Railer 998 P.2d 
254,. I 15 (Utah 2000), this Order is not final for purposes of 
appeal until this Court has disposed of the reserved attorney fee 
issue. 
DATED: April , 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
Timothy R. Hanson 
Thi rd D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a 




HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
a Utah general partnership, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000910098 
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a 
California limited partnership, 
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a 
California corporation, dba 
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG 
STORES, INC., an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by 
Hillside seeking a ruling on its Memorandum Opposing Award of 
Attorney's Fees to Rite Aid. The Court notes that it in a previous 
THRIFTY PAYLESS V. 
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ruling, the Court rejected Hillside's argument that Rite Aid was 
not entitled to attorney's fees. (See Minute Entry decision of 
June 17, 2002). In that same ruling, the Court indicated that it 
would schedule an evidentiary hearing for Hillside to dispute the 
reasonableness of the fees being sought, either through cross-
examination or through testimony. After this hearing was 
scheduled, the parties stipulated to forego an evidentiary hearing 
and instead filed a Stipulation Concerning Attorney Fees. 
In is Memorandum Opposing the award of attorney's fees, 
Hillside renews its argument that the fees being sought by Rite Aid 
are excessive and unreasonable. According to Hillside, the sheer 
amount of the fees being sought and the fact that Rite Aid employed 
two firms conclusively proves that the attorneys involved were 
inefficient in litigating a case that was not complex and did not 
involve novel legal issues. 
The Court agrees with Rite Aid that Hillside merely relies on 
its own assertion that the fees requested are too high, without 
providing any evidence to support its argument. The Court intended 
that the evidence to support this argument be established during 
the evidentiary hearing, which Hillside voluntarily waived. In 
the absence of concrete evidence to dispute the reasonableness of 
the fees involved, Hillside falls back on a comparison of the fees 
expended by both sides and the assertion that hirina fw^ -F«;>-~~ 
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(even if both bring a unique background or expertise to the matter) 
is a "nonessential luxury." The Court disagrees and concludes 
that these factors prove nothing in terms of efficiency or 
reasonableness. Without more, Hillsidefs opposition lacks amy 
legal basis for the Court to reduce the amount of fees being 
sought. Accordingly, the Court denies Hillside's Opposition and 
awards the full amount of fees sought by Rite Aid. 
Counsel for Rite Aid is to prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court for 
review and signature. 
Dated this <v^jay of December, 2002. 
TIMOTHY K. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN, MINNOCK & RICE, L.C. 
136 South Main Street, Ste. 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Facsimile: (801) 531-9732 
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BRUCE WYCOFF, No. 4448 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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PROPERTIES, and COLLIER'S 
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HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a California 




Case No. 000910098 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
vs. 
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a California : 
corporation d/b/a/ RITE AID; and : 
AMERICAN DRUG STORES, INC., : 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. : 
The Court, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expert Fees and Denying 
Hillside's Opposition Thereto, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant Hillside Plaza Ltd.'s Counterclaim be, and the same is, dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits; and 
2. Plaintiff Thrifty Payless, Inc. be, and the same is, hereby awarded judgment in the amount 
of $85,511.75 for attorneys' fees and $9,472.38 for costs and expert witness fees, for a total of 
$94,984.13; said judgment to bear interest at the rate of 7.3 % per annum until paid. 
DATED this 2fL day of J)&'^ 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
TIMCDTHYR. HANSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/Scotttl Mercer 
lg23»©, Hancey 
Attorneys for Defendant Hillside Plaza Ltd. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Y day of January, 2003,1 caused the original of the 
foregoing proposed JUDGMENT to be mailed via first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following 
for his approval as to form: 
Scott O. Mercer 
Ryan B. Hancey 
KESLER&RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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